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Abstract
This North-South model of Schumpeterian endogenous growth combines a market,
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ect. A set of various convergent and divergent growth
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usion through intermediate
goods trade is guaranteed if the knowledge eect dominates the productivity
eect. Moreover, a larger Southern market expands the area of convergence
and can prevent divergence. Not only a larger Southern market size, but also a
higher Southern steady state growth rate benet the North so that convergence is
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1 Introduction
One of the main topics in economics of growth is cross-country convergence versus di-
vergence. On the one hand, in the ideal neoclassical case, countries converge to identical
growth rates in the long-run steady state and under certain preconditions to identical
per-capita income levels. For example, the Nelson and Phelps (1966) mechanism of tech-
nology diusion yields convergence of the technology in practice towards the technology
frontier until a certain relative distance to the technology frontier is reached. On the
other hand, empirical evidence as summarized by Aghion and Howitt (2009), chapter 7,
shows that only certain groups of countries converge to parallel growth paths (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 1992, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992, Evans 1996), whereas the richest
and the poorest countries diverge (Maddison 2001, Mayer-Foulkes 2009). China is a
prominent example for a country that manages well to catch up economically, wherein
international technology diusion plays an important role. Sub-Sahara African countries
on the contrary do not make progress being stuck in a poverty trap.
Against this background, this paper improves on the Schumpeterian model of en-
dogenous growth (drawing upon Aghion and Howitt 2009, chapters 4, 7, 15 and 16)
by deriving various growth paths of North-South convergence and divergence that go
beyond the scope of the literature so far. In the underlying model intermediate goods
that embody advanced technologies are created in the North and can be utilized within
the North or traded to the South. For the rst time in the literature, convergence and
divergence are modeled via the interaction of a market, a productivity and a knowledge
eect.
The market eect (cf. Aghion and Howitt 2009, chapter 15) captures the expansion
of the intermediate goods market with an increasing labor force (population) and pro-
ductivity in both regions. It augments Northern and Southern growth in the same way.
As a consequence, it does not directly inuence convergence or divergence. As another
consequence, catching up of the South is also benecial for the North since it improves
the productivity and therefore attractiveness of and revenues from the Southern market.
This has important consequences, not highlighted in the literature so far: if the South
is able to catch up in terms its technology level and hence economic development by
growing more rapidly than the North, the North will achieve a higher growth rate as
well, during the transition phase and in the long-run steady state. A larger Southern
market indirectly fosters South-North convergence through the productivity eect.
The productivity eect (cf. Hubler 2011 in a model with exogenous growth), a crucial
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novel eect, captures the increase of technology diusion and thus growth in the ratio of
intermediate goods used in production in the South compared with the North. The intu-
ition is that intermediate goods are not only vertically dierentiated (via technological
improvements for each variety over time), but also horizontally (distinct varieties with
dierent characteristics). As a consequence, the South will receive half of the North's
technological knowledge if only half of the intermediate goods are traded from North
to South. The South-North ratio of intermediate goods is in turn proportional to the
South-North ratio of technology levels and the South-North ratio of labor: intermedi-
ate goods trade is driven by international productivity dierentials, and the marginal
product of intermediate goods rises in the technology level and in the volume of labor
input. Thus, a larger Southern labor force (market) improves technology diusion to the
South via intermediate goods trade. { Moreover, an exponential elasticity parameter
governs the marginal impact of the productivity eect. The productivity eect can be
detrimental and even catastrophic for the South: if the initial technology level of the
South is low, the South can fall even further behind in terms of technologies. The result-
ing growth rate will even be lower. The economic reason is that due to the worsening
marginal product of the intermediate goods input in the South, the Northern innovator
and intermediate goods producer sells less and less intermediate goods to the South.
The result is a downward spiral into a poverty trap in which the South falls further and
further behind the North in terms of technologies and per capita income.
The knowledge eect (or Gerschenkron eect, cf. the seminal work by Nelson and
Phelps 1966) works in the opposite direction: the further behind the South initially is in
terms of its technology level, the higher will be its growth rate. The intuition is simple:
the less one knows, the more and the faster one can learn. The related exponential
elasticity parameter governs the marginal impact of the knowledge eect. It increases in
the Southern absorptive capacity in reality. If the knowledge eect is strictly stronger
than the productivity eect, the South will catch up to the North or fall further behind
in terms of technologies, but only down to the point where its growth rate is equal to
the Northern growth rate. Thereafter, South and North will grow at the same rate at a
constant relative technology ratio in the steady state. A poverty trap does not emerge
when the knowledge eect dominates the productivity eect. Nevertheless, the South-
North technology gap can be substantial in the steady state if the Southern market is
small and the marginal impact of the knowledge eect is small.
The paper makes the following contributions: it locates the paper within the related
growth literature in section 2.
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It is the rst paper to set up a state-of-the-art Schumpeterian growth model that
combines a market, a productivity and a knowledge eect. This straightforward decom-
position of the channels of international technology diusion as detailed in section 3 has
been overlooked in the literature so far. It derives the distance-to-technology-frontier
eect in a new and intuitive way. Hence, it improves on the theoretical foundations
and the theoretical understanding of the channels of endogenous international technol-
ogy diusion. The model provides a useful mechanism for numerical large-scale growth
models with technology spillovers. Such models gain more and more importance for
studying long-term climate, development and trade issues. It provides a useful model
for econometric studies on growth and convergence too.
It is the second contribution of the paper to derive convergent and divergent growth
paths within this Schumpeterian model in a novel and straightforward way. These
growth paths derived in section 4 match various empirical ndings: (a) club conver-
gence, that is convergence in growth rates and technological catching up of advanced
economies, but divergence of laggard economies, (b) technology diusion that may in-
crease or decrease in the dierence between the technology in practice and the technology
frontier in various non-linear ways. The latter growth paths can much better describe the
development of emerging economies like China with persistently high growth rates than
the standard textbook model of convergence. The latter growth paths also t much
better to the diverse ndings of the econometric literature: accordingly, productivity
can increase or decrease in the distance to the technology frontier in various linear and
non-linear forms (inverted U-shape, U-shape, logistic; for example Girma et al. 2001,
Grith et al. 2004, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Girma 2005, Girma and Gorg 2007).
Based on these insights, the paper opts for a more distinct analysis of the barriers of
technology diusion to developing and emerging countries. The crucial barriers { that
are dierent for each country { should be specically addressed by policy measures. A
one-ts-all approach, on the contrary, can fail if the productivity eect renders policy
interaction that improves international technology transfer ineective. This applies to
poverty and development issues as well as to green growth and technology funding issues.
Such policy implications are discussed in section 5.
2 Literature
This section reviews the related literature. On the one hand, growth theory based on
the Gerschenkron (1962) eect, such as Nelson and Phelps (1966), suggests that growth
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increases in the existing dierence between the technology in practice and the technology
frontier. On the other hand, the econometric literature (OECD 2002, Saggi 2002, Keller
2004 and Hoekman and Javorcik 2006) about the eects of imports and FDI inows on
productivity and growth nds diverse results. The relation between the dierence to
the technology frontier and productivity gains can be increasing or decreasing in linear
or non-linear forms (inverted U-shape, U-shape, logistic; Girma et al. 2001, Grith et
al. 2004, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Girma 2005, Girma and Gorg 2007).
As a consequence of the diverse empirical facts on convergence and divergence, a
variety of theoretical models has been developed that distinguishes cross-country con-
vergence and divergence. In the category of exogenous growth models, the Solow-
Swan model predicts convergence through capital accumulation, but only within groups
of countries that have identical fundamental preconditions (savings rates, population
growth rates and production functions). Dierent economic preconditions of countries
result in convergence clubs with dierent steady state levels of per-capita income (club
convergence or conditional convergence). Moreover, in the Solow-Swan model, a poverty
trap can occur if the marginal product of capital (in eciency units) increases in some
stages and decreases in other stages during the process of capital accumulation (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 2004). This results in multiple steady states so that an economy can
get trapped in a steady state with low capital and production levels (poverty trap).
The category of endogenous growth models encompasses various model types. The
basic AK model does not produce cross-country convergence of growth rates. Basu
and Weil (1998) link technical progress to capital accumulation based on a simplied
learning-by-doing approach without R&D investments and endogenous growth. They
study perfect international mobility of capital and technology and derive a situation
where capital does not ow from North to South. More recently, Aghion and Howitt
(2009, chapter 7) describe club convergence in a Schumpeterian model of endogenous
growth by using an innovation cost function consisting of a linear and a quadratic
term. Moreover, Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter 11) describe a non-convergence trap
equilibrium where a country fails to switch from an imitation- to an innovation-based
strategy.
The literature that studies poverty traps in theoretical and empirical terms distin-
guishes critical thresholds, dysfunctional institutions and neighborhood eects as causes
for poverty (Bowles, Durlauf and Ho, 2006). This literature stream in general ne-
glects international technology diusion and trade in intermediate goods that embody
advanced technologies, though. { Aspects that will be addressed in this paper.
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Another literature stream examines the relation of trade and growth based on the
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and demonstrates the possibility of convergent as well as diver-
gent growth paths (Chen 1992, Mountford 1998, Atkeson and Kehoe 2000, Bajona and
Kehoe 2010).
Recently, the issue of international technology diusion and convergence in technol-
ogy levels has become crucial in the context of global warming: achieving ambitious
climate policy targets at acceptable costs requires the international diusion of energy
and carbon emissions saving technologies from industrialized to developing countries.
Herein, international technology diusion is closely related to international trade and
foreign direct investment (FDI) as channels of technology transfer. Foreign direct in-
vestment and related imports of investment goods are supposed to be supported in order
to save carbon emissions.
The interaction of international trade and FDI with endogenous growth and in-
ternational technology diusion has not yet been fully understood; in particular, the
occurrence of international convergence and divergence and thus poverty traps. This
paper deals with these open research aspects. It is related to the work by Grossman
and Helpman (1991), chapters 9 and 11, Aghion and Howitt (2009), chapter 15, and
Acemoglu et al. (2012) (for the latter also see Aghion and Howitt 2009, chapter 16, in
a simplied version). Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (2009)
study international technology diusion, in other words imitation, related to interna-
tional trade in an endogenous growth context. Acemoglu et al. (forthcoming) show that
a subsidy on clean innovation additional to a tax on dirty production is necessary for
an ecient shift from dirty to clean production and that this policy intervention can be
temporary under certain conditions.
3 Model
The following North-South model follows the Schumpeterian view of quality improve-
ments as a driver of economic growth (based on Aghion and Howitt 2009, chapter 4 in
combination with chapters 7, 15 and 16). In our model, technology does not spillover
completely and immediately to the South but rather diuses according to a distance-
to-technology-frontier approach. Furthermore, a monopolist distributes intermediate
goods across North and South depending on relative productivities and therefore on the
current technology gap. These modications will create new results.
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3.1 Production
We assume two regions called North and South r = fn; sg and a discrete series of time
periods t. Aggregate production Yrt is described by a Cobb-Douglas technology in each
region:
Yrt = (ArtLr)
1 xrt (1)
This technology uses the inputs labor Lr, which is a certain fraction of the population
of each region and constant over time, and intermediate goods xrt, which is endogenous.
1  and 0 <  < 1 are the related exponents or income shares. Art reects productivity
of xrt in each period. ArtLr can be interpreted as the economies' eective labor supply
or as its eective market size.
We assume, production of xrt is the source of technical progress that raises Art.
We further assume, only one monopolist located in the North is able to create inter-
mediate goods that embody such advanced technologies. In the North, output Yn can
be transferred into intermediate goods in a 1:1 fashion by the monopolist. Thereafter,
the intermediate goods can be perfectly traded across regions and used as a production
input in both regions. Therefore, net income { available for consumption and for R&D
expenditures in the North { generated by nal production simply reads:
Gnt = Ynt  Xt (2)
Gst = Yst (3)
where Xt = xnt + xst. In each region a representative, risk neutral consumer draws
utility from consumption Crt in a linear fashion. Each consumer maximizes consumption
expected over time (c.f. Aghion and Howitt 2009, chapter 4) without discounting the
future so that the objective simply becomes: maxCrt.
Selling xst to the South, the Northern monopolist earns a revenue, as she or he does
in the North. The monopolist chooses Xt in a prot maximizing way, where pt is the
price of Xt:
max
Xt
rt = ptXt  Xt (4)
In a perfectly competitive equilibrium of Y production, in each region input xrt is
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demanded for production to such an extent that its price equals its marginal product:
pt =
@Yrt
@xrt
= (ArtLr)
1 x 1rt (5)
Solving for xrt and summing up xrt over regions yields in the symmetric case (with the
same  for both regions):
Xt = (AntLn +AstLs)
pt

 1
 1
(6)
, pt = (AntLn +AstLs)1 X 1t (7)
We calculate the optimal price and quantity of Xt by inserting into the prot equation
and by maximizing prots. Inserting furthermore the price of Xt into the xrt demand
functions yields the optimal quantities; and inserting into the prot function yields the
maximal prot of the monopolist:1
p0t =
1

(8)
X0t = (AntLn +AstLs)
2
1  (9)
x0rt = ArtLr
2
1  (10)
0nt = (AntLn +AstLs) (11)
where  = (1  ) 1+1  .
Inserting x0rt into the production function (1) yields:
Y 0rt = ArtLr
2
1  (12)
Accordingly, in each region output is proportional to technology and labor (population).
Now prots can be re-written as:
0nt =

1

  1

(Y 0nt + Y
0
st) (13)
In the North, overall net income, denoted by C0nt consists of G
0
nt, the value of Northern
nal production minus the value of intermediate inputs used in the North and in the
South, plus 0nt, the prot gained by supplying intermediate inputs within the North
and to the South, minus R0nt, R&D expenditures by the X producer that will be detailed
1Optimality is indicated by 0.
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in the following section. In the South, overall net income, C0st, consists of G
0
nt minus
the prot repatriated to the North for receiving the intermediate input x0st, which is 
1
   1

Y 0st according to (13):
C0nt =
1

Y 0nt   x0nt   x0st  R0nt (14)
C0st =

2  1


Y 0st (15)
This implies, intermediate goods with the value ptxst = 
1+
1  are traded from North to
South, while a revenue (in nancial form or in form of nal goods) with the same value
expressed as Yst = 
1+
1  is repatriated from South to North.2
3.2 Innovation
In each period, entrepreneurs attempt to become the monopolist by making a successful
innovation. { Note that the producers of intermediate goods X are also the innovators
who improve these intermediate goods. { A successful innovation creates a new variety
of intermediate goods that is qualitatively superior to previous varieties. Therefore,
given a successful innovation, the monopolist supplies the whole market for intermediate
goods and earns a monopoly rent as described in the last section. In order to create an
innovation, she needs to undertake research (R&D) that involves costs. An entrepreneur
can decide upon how much to spend on research, denoted by Rnt. The more she spends
on research, the higher the probability  of a successful innovation:
t = 

Rnt
Ant

= 

Rnt
Ant

(16)
The R&D function (:) adopted from Aghion and Howitt implies that research costs in-
crease in the existing technology level Ant. This means, it becomes increasingly dicult
to push the technology frontier forward, the more the frontier has already been pushed
forward. As Aghion and Howitt, we assume 0 <  < 1, so that the marginal product of
R&D expenditures is positive but decreasing.3 At the same time, each technological step
becomes larger over time in absolute terms. This implies that technical progress builds
on the existing technological knowledge and that knowledge has public good character.
Additionally, we assume throughout the paper Ant  Ast, that means the North is
2This can be veried by multiplying (8) with (10) and comparing the result to (12) multiplied by 
for r = s in each case.
3For example, it is more dicult to raise the speed of a microprocessor once in the speed has already
come close to the technically possible limit a late stage of development than at an early stage.
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the technology leader, and the South is the follower. For this reason, we assume that
research costs are { at least at the margin { determined by the higher technology level
Ant. At the same time, as we know from the previous section, prots also increase in Ant
and in Ast. In particular, the entrepreneur solves the following maximization problem
where prots nt, as derived in the previous section, are inserted after maximization:
4
max
Rnt


Rnt
Ant

0nt   Rnt (17)
) 0

Rnt
Ant

0nt
Ant
= 1 (18)
) 

Rnt
Ant
 1


Ln +
Ast
Ant
Ls

= 1 (19)
The latter equation is called the research arbitrage condition. Dierent to Aghion and
Howitt, the RntAnt ratio does not stay constant over time. It rather increases when the
Southern technology level catches up to the Northern level so that AstAnt increases. While
this happens, the Southern market becomes more attractive (more productive) which
induces higher R&D eorts to deliver the Southern market with intermediate goods.
Note that the monopolist cannot choose Ant, but only Rnt given a certain Ant at a
certain point of time. Thus, Ant and Ast are exogenous variables with respect to the
monopolist's decision. In this respect, the monopolist is myopic. She does not anticipate
the inuence of today's research expenditures on future technology levels and thus on
future research expenditures.
We gain the optimal R&D expenditure and the resulting probability of a successful
innovation:
R0nt
Ant
=



Ln +
Ast
Ant
Ls
 1
1 
(20)
) t = 
1
1 



Ln +
Ast
Ant
Ls
 
1 
(21)
4 Analysis
This section derives the Northern and the Southern growth rate and identies convergent
and divergent growth paths. The rst subsection is strictly algebraic, whereas the second
4Dierent to an endogenous growth model with horizontal product dierentiation, an innovation (a
patent) holds only for a limited period of time in this model with vertical product dierentiation through
Schumpeterian creative destruction. Thus, prots are only gained within this period, not in form of a
prot stream until innity.
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subsection parameterizes the model to illustrate the various possible growth paths.
4.1 Growth
We can see from equation (1) that per capita output YrtLr is proportional to the technology
Art. Therefore, output grows at the same rate as technology. In the following, we will
therefore only derive technology growth rates. First, by the Law of Large Numbers, 
represents the expected log-run frequency of the appearance of successful innovations.
Second, in case of a successful innovation, the newly developed technology At will replace
the old technology At 1. The size of each step of technical progress is described by
 = AtAt 1 . In case of an innovation failure, which occurs with probability 1  , the old
technology will be used further so that At = At 1. The regional technology growth rate
is determined by successful innovations and reads:
grt = t(rt   1) (22)
Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter 7) and Acemoglu (2009, chapter 18) assume that
rt   1 increases in the existing technology gap between the technology frontier and
the technology in practice (Gerschenkron 1962 eect). We basically follow this idea
but particularly set up a modied functional relationship derived from straightforward
arguments that will provide new insights. We follow the view of Nelson and Phelps
(1966) that the change in technology in a certain period is given by the existing North-
South technology dierence:
Ast = Ant  Ast (23)
, Ast
Ast
=
Ant
Ast
  1 =: g0rt (24)
This formulation is straightforward by the following argumentation: in case of homoge-
nous technology stocks Art and Ant > Ast and perfect technology diusion between
regions without time delay and without bounds, the technology gain Ast is exactly
equal to the inter-regional technology dierence. However, there are bounds in reality
so that Ast < Ant  Ast or Ast = (Ant  Ast), 0 <  < 1.
We consider the following determinant of : as a novel element, we make the plausible
assumption that the South receives the same amount of new technological knowledge
as the North only if xst = xnt. This implies a certain \horizontal" heterogeneity of
technologies within each \vertical" variety of technology in each period. If xst < xnt,
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only part of the \horizontal" varieties is transferred to the South and thus can be
adopted: if each single variety has the same value, a lower value of the sum of all
varieties xst implies a smaller number of varieties. Thus,  increases in
xst
xnt
in a linear
or in general in a non-linear way so that  

xst
xnt
X
. A higher exponential elasticity
parameter X results in a larger marginal impact of the relative Southern intermediate
goods inow on technical progress.
In the analog way, the technology gap may inuence technology diusion in a linear
or non-linear way so that we consider

Ant
Ast
  1
A
as a more general functional form
derived from equation (24). A can be assumed to increase in the absorptive capacity,
determined by education, infrastructure, the legal system and so forth. The absorptive
capacity determines in how far the inow of knowledge embodied in intermediate goods
can be exploited by the South. A higher exponential elasticity parameter A results in a
larger marginal impact of the relative Southern intermediate goods inow on technical
progress.
The overall strength of technical progress in the South as in the North is governed by
the constant 	 which is determined by technological (engineering) constraints. There is
one case in which solely the 	 term determines technical progress: if a Southern region
has become the technology leader, the distance to frontier term will become obsolete.
Conversely, there is one case in which no technical progress occurs in the South at all:
if the relative technology level of the South has dropped towards zero so that quasi
no intermediate goods are allocated to this region.5 Whereas the South can benet
from technology diusion, the North can only benet from innovation since the North
determines the technology frontier.
Combining these mechanisms and collecting terms leads to the following steps of
technical progress in case of a successful innovation in the North and the South:
nt   1 = 	 (25)
st   1 = 	

xst
xnt
X "
1 +

Ant
Ast
  1
A#
(26)
We now come to a crucial step. According to section 3.1, we can replace the South-North
5Intermediate goods also enter the Southern production function as a necessary input. Thus, produc-
tion would cease if no intermediate goods were delivered because of a too low productivity. To prevent
this eect, one may add a constant term to the intermediate goods input xst in the production function.
Such a constant term may represent any local substitutes for xst. Without loss of generality, we leave
this constant out in the calculations for the sake of mathematical simplicity.
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ratio of intermediate inputs by the optimal South-North ratio of eective labor:
x0st
x0nt
=
AstLs
AntLn
(27)
) st   1 = 	

AstLs
AntLn
X "
1 +

Ant
Ast
  1
A#
(28)
Finally, after inserting the expression for t derived in section 3.2, we arrive at the
following growth rates in the North:
gnt = L

1 
n

1 +
Ast
Ant
Ls
Ln
 
1 
| {z }
market
	 (29)
and in the South:
gst = L

1 
n

1 +
Ast
Ant
Ls
Ln
 
1 
| {z }
market
	

Ast
Ant
Ls
Ln
X
| {z }
productivity
266641 +

Ant
Ast
  1
A
| {z }
knowledge
37775 (30)
where we write  = 
1
1  ()

1  for simplicity. We can distinguish a market, a produc-
tivity and a knowledge eect of the technology ratio AstAnt as prescribed in the equations
above.
4.2 Convergence
A steady state dened as a situation with equal growth rates satises the condition
gst = gnt. South-North convergence requires gst > gnt. The related conditions can
easily be derived with the help of (29) and (30). Convergence, leading to a the steady
state with equal growth rates, thus requires:

Ant
Ast
Ln
Ls
X
  1 <

Ant
Ast
  1
A
(31)
Proposition 1. The market eect aects both, South and North, simultaneously and
can thus not guarantee convergence.
Proof. The market eect as dened in Equations (29) and (30) cancels out with
respect to convergence and divergence since it aects both regions in the same way.
This is evident in Inequality (31). 
Proposition 2. If the knowledge eect dominates the productivity eect, i.e. if A >
X , there will exist an area of convergence. If not, there can be either convergence or
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divergence depending on the size of the Southern labor force (market).
Proof. The condition for convergence will be fullled when the knowledge ef-
fect on the right hand side of Inequality (31) is stronger than the productivity ef-
fect on the left hand side. It is particularly relevant to examine the situation when
the Southern technology level falls further and further behind the Northern one, i.e.
limAnt!0

Ant
Ast
Ln
Ls
X   1 < limAst!0 AntAst   1A with all variables in the equation
being positive and nite. This condition will asymptotically be fullled if A > X .
Depending on the level of Ast and thus
Ant
Ast
for which the condition is fullled, the area
of convergence will be larger or smaller. If, on the opposite A < X , there can be
convergence or divergence depending on whether Inequality (31) holds for certain values
of AntAst or not. 
Proposition 3. The larger the Southern labor force (market) relative to the Northern
one, i.e. the higher the ratio LsLn , the larger will be the area of convergence and the
South-North technology ratio in the long-run steady state.
Proof. One can easily see that a larger Ls relative to Ln reduces the left hand side of
Inequality (31) so that the condition is ceteris paribus more likely fullled for suciently
high values of Ast. The area of convergence will hence become larger. And the likelihood
of convergence in the absence of a dominant knowledge eect (A < X) will raise with
respect to Proposition 2. 
4.3 Simulation
This section parameterizes the model in order to illustrate various South-North growth
paths. As we will see, the simulation results corroborate Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
For simplicity, we normalize most parameter values to one:  = 1;Ln = 1; =
0:5 ) 1  = 1;	 = 1. A low market eect means Ls = 0:5 so that the Southern
labor force size is half the Northern one. A high market eect implies Ls = 1 so that
the Southern labor force has the same size as the Northern one. A low productivity
eect is characterized by X = 0:5, a very low one by X = 0:25. In the same vein,
a low knowledge eect is characterized by A = 0:5, a very low one by A = 0:25 and
additionally a high one by X = 1. Figure 1 visualizes the simulation results for various
parameter settings regarding the strength of the market, productivity and knowledge
eect. In each subgure, the horizontal axis depicts the South-North technology ratio
which can take values between zero and one. The vertical axis depicts the corresponding
growth rates of the North and the South. The growth values can be interpreted as annual
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percentage rates. The right axis represents the technology frontier given by the North
where AstAnt = 1.
The intersection of the growth paths of North and South will be a long-run steady
state with equal growth rates and dierent technology levels if it is a stable situation.
Full South-North convergence in growth rates as well as technology levels will be achieved
if the Southern growth path is for all possible South-North technology ratios above the
Northern path. On the opposite, full divergence irrespective of the initial South-North
technology ratio will be the case if the Southern growth path is for all possible South-
North technology ratios below the Northern path. The classical case of convergence
occurs when the Southern growth rate is higher than the Northern one the left hand
side of the intersection, and the Northern growth rate is higher than the Southern one on
the right hand side. Divergence occurs in the opposite case. In this case, the intersection
of the two growth paths is instable.
Figure 1 illustrates various constellations of parameter settings and hence relative
magnitudes of the market, productivity and knowledge eect relative to each other. The
left column always illustrates a constellation with a low Southern labor force, whereas
the right column always illustrates a constellation with a high Southern labor force.
The classical case of convergence is illustrated in Figure 1 (a). The farther away the
South is from the North in terms of its technology level, the higher will be its growth.
This clearly results in South-North convergence until the intersection point with equal
growth rates is reached { for this parameter setting at a South-North technology ratio of
about 0.5. This case emerges because the knowledge eect is dominant so that Southern
growth monotonously decreases in the South-North technology ratio. It is the classical
Nelson-and-Phelps style textbook case. There is convergence, and there is a continuous
decline in the growth rate during the catching up process too.
When the Southern market expressed as the size of its labor force expands, the
intersection point will move to the right, and hence the convergence area will increase
as spelled out by Proposition 3. In Figure 1 (b) the intersection point has moved that
far to the right that it is beyond the right axis. This results in full convergence for all
South-North technology ratios. The South will nally reach the same technology level
as the North. Thereafter, the South will persistently growth with the same growth rate
as the North because its labor force has the same the size as the Northern one. If the
South has a larger labor force, its growth rate will be persistently higher than that of the
North, e.g. over 4 percent per annum when the South has double the market size of the
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North (not shown in the gure).6 In this case, the South can apply the state-of-the-art
technology to a larger labor force than the North and achieve higher growth. In both
convergent cases, (a) and (b), the knowledge eect dominates the productivity eect as
prescribed by Proposition 2.
In Figure 1 (c) the knowledge eect is still more pronounced than the productivity
eect; yet both eects are weaker. As a consequence, the South's skyrocketing growth
at low technology levels is mitigated. Moreover, the decline in its growth rate when
coming closer to the technology frontier given by the North is mitigated too. The result
is visible as a at region with an almost constant growth rate at a relative technology
ratio between 0.2 and 0.8. This constellation allows emerging economies to catch up
without suering a permanent signicant decline in the growth rate. Notwithstanding,
the Southern growth rate dilutes and reaches the Northern one at a certain South-North
technology ratio, i.e. a certain proximity to the technology frontier given by the right
axis denoting AstAnt = 1. The intersection point is obviously much closer to the technology
frontier than in (a) with a higher knowledge and productivity eect.
The characteristic eect of (c) is exacerbated in (d) due to a larger Southern labor
force: now the Southern growth rate even rises during the catching up phase until full
equality of technology levels is achieved on the right axis. This constellations reconciles
the view that growth rises in the distance to the technology frontier (on the left hand
side) because of a higher learning potential with the view that growth rises in the simi-
larity of technology source and recipient (moving to the right hand side). Nonetheless,
the Southern growth rate falls down to the Northern one when reaching equal technology
levels because the Southern technology level gained solely via technology diusion from
the North cannot exceed the Northern one and hence creates the same growth eect in
the South in case of equal market sizes. The graphs (a) to (d) relate to Propositions 1
and 2 which state that convergence is guaranteed when the knowledge eect exceeds the
productivity eect independent of the market eect. They refer to Proposition 3 too,
which arms that a larger Southern labor force enlarges the area of convergence.
On the contrary, case (e) can be called tragic because the Northern growth path is
an upward tangent to the Southern growth path. Hence, although there is a touching
point, it is not stable: a minor shock shock can push the South down to the divergent
path on the left. When the Southern labor force is even smaller, the Southern growth
rate will completely lie below the Northern one, which is the case of full divergence (not
6This can easily be veried by inserting in Equations 29 and 30.
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shown in the gure).
The opposite will happen when the Southern labor force becomes larger as visualized
by Figure 1 (f): the intersection point has moved so far in the upper right direction that
it lies beyond AstAnt = 1. Hence, the larger labor force has remedied the divergence
problem. The eect that Southern growth accelerates during the catching up phase is
even more pronounced than in (d).
Figure 1 (g) depicts a more complex growth structure which contains a divergent
intersection point in the middle and a convergent intersection point on the right. Now
the occurrence of divergence or convergence depends upon the initial technology level:
if the South starts in the divergent area left of the middle, it will fall further and further
behind the North towards the left. If the South starts right of the middle, it will catch
up until it reaches the right intersection point close to the technology frontier. This is
the most illustrative case generated by this model. It highlights that a slightly modied
stylized model of endogenous growth opens a much richer set of South-North growth
constellations than the classical textbook case depicted in (a). This constellation will
allow for the coexistence of convergent and divergent behavior of economies and thus
club convergence when the model is applied to a set of heterogeneous economies.
The larger labor force assumed in (h) has moves the intersection point to the left and
thus widened the area of convergence as declared by Proposition 3. Notwithstanding,
a strong market eect does not guarantee convergence as spelled out by Proposition 1:
a larger labor force (market) only enlarges the area of convergence. This means, when
the Southern labor force exceeds the Northern one even more, the intersection point will
shift further to the left, while a small area of divergence will still exist.
To conclude, in constellations (d), (f) and (h) with a high Southern labor force
(market) growth is not continuously attenuated during catching up as in the classical
textbook case. This ts to China's and India's development, both economies with huge
labor forces (markets). In constellations (e), (g) and (h) economies with initially low
technology levels diverge away from the technology frontier. This ts for example to
Sub-Sahara African countries stuck in poverty.
It is obvious that a long-run steady state lying further at the right not only implies
a higher Southern growth rate, but also a higher Northern one. Hence, convergence
benets both, South and North, not only in the level of economic activity, but also in
the rate of persistent growth.
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4.4 Interpretation
This section interprets the model behavior from a more general point of view.
In a more general context, Taylor (2009) emphasizes three preconditions for (envi-
ronmental) crises: (1) failures in governance, (2) a system exhibiting a tipping point,
and (3) economic (environmental) interactions with positive feedbacks.
The model analyzed above fullls these criteria: (1) Many developing countries suer
from poor governance by political leaders and elites who pronounce their own success
and wealth rather than national progress and wealth. As a consequence, education,
infrastructure, the legal system, the economic conditions such as local taxes and other
factors are insucient for attracting foreign capital and spreading and absorbing foreign
technologies, resulting in a low A in the model. Moreover, the initial technology levels of
such countries are often low. Hence, they likely start in the area of divergence visualized
in Figure 1 (e), (g) and (h). (2) In these graphs, the areas of convergence and divergence
are separated by a tipping point. (3) A feedback mechanism will be generated if the
productivity eect dominates so that a lower technology level in the South, i.e. a low
Ast in the model, relative to the North reduces the input of intermediate goods in the
South relative to the North and hence technology diusion. This reduces the relative
technology level increasingly. The resulting crisis is in our model a poverty trap in which
the South falls further and further behind due to divergence so that the South-North
technology ratio AstAnt approaches zero.
5 Conclusion
The endogenous growth model that we examined combines a (1) market, (2) productivity
and (3) knowledge eect that determine the growth rate of a developing region, called
the South. A higher growth rate in the South than in the industrialized region, called
the North, implies convergence. The analysis shows that dominance of the productivity
eect results in the possibility of divergence whereas dominance of the knowledge eect
results in convergence. In the divergence case case, there can be a tipping point between
convergence and divergence. This indicates that market forces may fail to create cross-
country convergence and may leave countries in poverty traps as observed in reality.
A larger Southern population and hence labor force and market expands the area of
convergence and makes convergence more likely when the productivity eect dominates.
Supporting technology diusion to the South is not only benecial for the South, but
also for the North because of the market eect. The market eect will raise the annual
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growth rate of the North and thus create substantial revenues over time if the mechanism
of international technology diusion via intermediate goods trade works. Therefore, it
would be rational for the North to support and nance international technology diusion.
Southern economies that are stuck in poverty traps or that are near the tipping point
between convergence and divergence require special and urgent attention. The reason
is that the dierence in terms of growth and wealth between the situation when the
South is on a convergent path and when the South is on a divergent path for both, the
North and the South, increases over time. It becomes more and more challenging to
switch from a divergent to a convergent path because the South-North technology gap
increases. As a consequence, less intermediate inputs and hence technologies diuse to
the South so that it becomes increasingly dicult to close the technology gap. Thus, it
is rational to lift such countries onto convergent growth paths or to prevent them from
falling to divergent paths as early as possible. This is in the interest of the industrialized
countries since they will benet from trading with successfully growing economies via
the market eect.
In summary, the novel separation of the channels of endogenous technology diusion
in a (1) market, (2) productivity and (3) knowledge eect helps us understand through
which channel technology diusion fails in a specic economy. Accordingly, the analy-
sis stresses the importance of enabling and fostering international technology diusion
through (1) the creation of suciently large competitive markets, (2) lifting the initial
technology levels of countries at low technology levels and reducing market barriers that
hinder international trade and thus technology transfer, and (3) the improvement of the
absorptive capacity of developing countries so that the technological knowledge embod-
ied in inowing goods can be exploited. This threefold separation contradicts simple
one-ts-all policies. For example, the improvement of the absorptive capacity might turn
out to be ineective because there is no suciently large prevailing technology level or
the market is too small so that the productivity eect creates divergence. Or when
convergence can be achieved given the absorptive capacity, an insucient size and com-
petitiveness of the Southern market can nonetheless tare down the pace of convergence.
Thus, policy intervention should be aware of these interconnected forces. { Building on
these insights, future research could take technological uncertainty into account.
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Figure 1: Simulation results for dierent parameter settings.
22
